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Abstract: : In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was 
appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government 
was  answerable  only  to  the  US  Federal  government,  a  large 
state-owned  enterprise  (SOE)  sector  was  established  on  the 
island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy 
were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were 
created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, 
and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed 
by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 
1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government 
sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both 
the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto 
Rico,  and  analyzes  the  role  played  by  ideology,  political 
interests,  and  economic  concerns  in  the  decision  to  privatize 
them.  Whereas  ideological  factors  might  have  played  a 
significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that 
privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as 
the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the 
SOEs  operated,  and  by  the  desire  to  attract  private  industrial 
investment to the Puerto Rican economy. 
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THE FIRST PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY:  
SELLING STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN 1948-1950 PUERTO RICO. 
Privatization is a policy that has been implemented all over the world in recent decades.1 In 
regions such as Europe and Latin America privatization has been characterized primarily by the 
sale to the private sector of government owned firms and assets.2 In other regions where public 
ownership of firms was not as common, such as North America, privatization has mainly taken 
the  form  of  contracting  out  services  previously  delivered  by  the  government  to  the  private 
sector.3 Most Economics and Public Policy scholars consider the privatizations in Chile (1970s 
early 1980s) and the United Kingdom (1980s early 1990s) as the first privatization policies in 
modern history.4 Others argue that the first privatization operation was the denationalization of 
steel in the UK in 1953,5 and a few scholars identify the partial sales of state owned enterprises 
in  Germany  under  Adenauer’s  government  (late  1950s early  1960s)  as  the  first  large scale 
privatization program.6 However, recently published works document and analyze a large scale 
privatization policy in 1930s Germany, under Hitler’s government.7 Indeed, between 1934 and 
1937, the Nazi regime privatized almost all the firms that had been taken over by the Weimar 
government in the early 1930s during the Great Depression.  
                                                 
1 Roland, “Private and public ownership”, p. 9. 
2 Bortolotti and Milella, “Privatization in Western Europe”, p. 33; Estache and Trujillo, “Privatization in Latin 
America”, p. 136; Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar, “Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe”, p. 85; Kay and 
Thompson, “Privatisation”, p. 18; Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization, p.7. 
3 Donahue, The privatization decision, p. 3; Sappington and Stiglitz, ‘Privatization’, p. 567; Savas, Privatization, p. 3. 
Public services have been contracted out to the private sector in many developed countries. 
4 Bortolotti and Milella, “Privatization in Western Europe”, p. 32; Estache and Trujillo, “Privatization in Latin 
America”, p. 136; Yergin and Stanislaw, Commanding heights, p. 115. 
5 Burk, First privatization; Megginson and Netter, “History and methods”, p. 31. 
6 Megginson, Financial economics, p. 15; Schipke, Why Do Governments Divest?, p. 50.  
7 Bel, “The coining of ‘privatization’”, and “Against the mainstream”.  
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Contemporary economic analyses of privatization have so far failed to take into account an 
important, early case of large scale privatization: the one carried out by the first democratically 
elected Governor of Puerto Rico in the late 1940s, which appears to have been the first large 
scale  privatization  policy  implemented  in  a  democratic  regime.8 A  number  of  studies  in  the 
1950s9 and 1960s10 analyzed industrial and administrative policy in Puerto Rico, and noticed the 
sale of the state owned enterprises by Luis Muñoz Marín’s government between 1948 and 1950 
but,  perhaps  unexpectedly,  the  modern  literature  on  privatization  totally  ignores  this  early 
privatization experience. Even more surprisingly, the recent literature on the twentieth century 
Puerto Rican economy and the history of the island’s industrial policy either has nothing to say 
on the subject or mentions it only in passing.11  
Within two years of the first democratic gubernatorial election in Puerto Rico in 1948, the 
government of the Partido Popular Democrático (the Democratic Popular Party) had privatized all 
manufacturing state owned firms. These firms belonged to a wide range of sectors: cement, 
glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. The enterprises which were transferred to 
the private sector had been created during the 1940s in an attempt to promote industrialization 
and  had  been  managed  by  the  island’s  government,  still  under  the  tenure  of  Governors 
                                                 
8 I am aware of one previous privatization operation (with transfer of full control to the private sector) implemented 
by a democratic government: In 1928 the Australian government sold a fleet of cargo ships that had been purchased 
during World War I to a private company (Neville, Denationalisation, pp. 18 19). This operation, which was in fact a 
reprivatization, was a single measure and it was not implemented within the framework of a wide privatization 
policy.  
9 Baer, “Puerto Rico”, p. 649; Chase, Operation Bootstrap, p. 22; Lewis, “Puerto Rico”, p. 625; Ojuda, The industrial 
development program, pp. 139 141; Ross, “Gordon Lewis”, pp. 88 90. 
10 Goodsell, Administration of a revolution, p. 179; Ross, The Long Uphill Path, pp. 108 117. 
11 Curet, Puerto Rico; Curet Cuevas, Economía política; De Jesús Toro, Historia económica; Irizarry Mora, Economía de 
Puerto Rico. One relative exception is Dietz’s Economic History, published in 1986. This book briefly describes (pp. 
215 216) the basic characteristics of the sale of state owned firms. To do so, Dietz follows (and credits) the earlier 
account by Ross, The Long Uphill Path, but does not add any original research or further analysis.  
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appointed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States.  The  decision  to  establish  a  state owned 
manufacturing sector was taken within the pre War and wartime context, when the growing 
tension and subsequent hostilities profoundly affected maritime transportation and commerce in 
the Caribbean, particularly between 1942 and 1944.  
In 1939, Cementos de Puerto Rico (the Puerto Rico Cement Company) had begun operations 
and had become the island’s largest industrial factory at that time. Built by the Puerto Rico 
Reconstruction Administration, this plant was transferred to the Island Government on May 11, 
1942.
12 From 1942 onwards, five more manufacturing corporations were created. Four of them 
built factories and began commercial operations between 1945 and 1947: the Puerto Rico Glass 
Corporation,  the  Puerto  Rico  Pulp  and  Paper  Corporation,  the  Puerto  Rico  Clay  Products 
Corporation, and the Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation.
13 All these firms, including the 
cement plant, were later privatized, between 1948 and 1950. 
The nationalization of existing public services companies (such as water, transportation and 
energy) and the creation of state owned enterprise sectors was an important policy decision in 
Puerto  Rico  in  the  early  1940s.  Nationalization  and  the  expansion  of  the  SOE  sector were 
common in other countries in Latin America during the decade, but Puerto Rico was alone in 
reversing the trend and developing a policy of privatization of the state owned manufacturing 
firms in the late 1940s; in fact, in the post War period no other country in the world engaged in 
such a policy until 1959,14 when Adenauer’s Germany embarked on a privatization program 
which would last six years (although on a smaller scale than that applied in Puerto Rico, since 
                                                 
12 PRDC, Annual Report 1944, p. 27. 
13 In the case of the sixth subsidiary, Telares de Puerto Rico, inc., operations never actually started (PRIDCO, 
Annual Report.…1951, p. 27) 
14 As mentioned above, Churchill’s government reprivatized the steel in the United Kingdom in 1953, but this was a 
single operation intended to reverse the nationalization implemented by the Labour government in the late 1940s. 
No large scale privatization policy was implemented besides the reprivatization of steel.   
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only  three  firms  were  partially  privatized).15  Therefore,  a  central  question  remains  to  be 
answered: Why did the Puerto Rico government depart from the mainstream policies regarding 
State ownership in the post World War II era, and why did the government transfer state owned 
manufacturing firms to the private sector?  
Answering these questions requires an analysis of the objectives of the country’s privatization 
scheme. Some of the contemporary analyses written in the 1960s are valuable,16 but the authors 
of these studies lacked the theories, concepts, and tools supplied by recent literature. Theoretical 
developments have provided valuable hypotheses on the motivations of politicians choosing 
between public ownership and privatization17 and have identified different objectives linked to 
privatization policies:18 On the one hand, both the theoretical and the empirical literature have 
provided interesting results regarding the use of privatization to obtain political support,19 and on 
the other international evidence shows as well that financial motivations have been a key factor 
in recent privatizations.20  
This paper intends to fill a gap in the current economic literature by tracing the course of 
privatization in 1948 1950 Puerto Rico through a study of Muñoz Marin’s personal archive (only 
                                                 
15 These firms were Preussag 1959, Volkswagen in 1961 and VEBA in 1965 (Schipke, Why Do Governments Divest?, p. 
50). 
16 Particularly Ross, The Long Uphill Path, pp. 108 117, written in 1960 and first published in 1966, which is the only 
thorough description of the sale of the state owned enterprises in Puerto Rico. 
17 Bel and Calzada, “Privatization”; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, “A theory of privatization”; Shleifer and Vishny, 
“Politicians and firms”. 
18 Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization; Vickers and Yarrow, “Economic perspectives”.  
19 Bel and Fageda, “Factors explaining”; Biais and Perotti, “Machiavellian privatization”; Bortolotti, Fantini, and 
Siniscalco, “Privatisation around the World”; Perotti, “Credible privatization”. 
20 Bortolotti and Milella, “Privatization in Western Europe”; Yarrow, “A Theory of Privatization”.  
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accessible after the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín was created in 1980),21 and documentation of 
the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, which only became available after they were 
donated to the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín in December 2008. The analysis of privatization in 
Puerto Rico suggests that the objectives pursued by the island government were mostly related 
to  economic  concerns.  One  key  factor was  the  much  higher  level  of  efficiency  achieved  in 
comparable private firms on the island, and another was the desire to enhance Puerto Rico’s 
ability  to  attract  private  capital  (particularly  from  continental  US)  to  invest  in  industries.  In 
contrast,  fiscal  objectives  do  not  seem  to  have  been  an  important  issue  in  the  decision  to 
privatize; nor did strong ideological or political motivations play a significant role.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I sketch the background to the study with 
a brief description of pre World War II Puerto Rico and document the building of the Puerto 
Rico SOE sector. Next, I examine the privatization process and its results. After this, I analyze 
the objectives of privatization policy in Puerto Rico. Finally, the main conclusions are drawn. 
 
PUERTO RICO IN THE INTER-WAR ERA 
During practically all the first half of the twentieth century, the President of the US appointed 
the Governor of Puerto Rico and the leading figures of the island’s government. After 1917, the 
island’s voters democratically elected the Puerto Rico Legislature (Senate plus Lower House). 
The President of the Senate was the main local policymaker, and enjoyed substantial power, 
although the US Congress retained the last word regarding the legislation passed in the Puerto 
Rico Legislature. The island’s Governor was answerable only to the US President, but needed to 
negotiate with the Puerto Rico Legislature in order to pass legislation and to appropriate budget 
funds for implementing the government programs. Although civil law in Puerto Rico retained 
                                                 
21 Within Muñoz Marin’s personal archive held by the Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, the following sources have 
been particularly useful: Section IV, Series 2 [(a) personal correspondence; (b) Data and statistics]; Section V, series 
16 (Statistics and Economic reports].  
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features  inherited  from  the  legal  tradition  of  the  Spanish  colonial  period,  the  legislation 
regulating the economy was basically the same as in the US.22 
Within the policies implemented under Roosevelt’s New Deal, in August 1933 the Puerto 
Rican Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) was set up to provide economic assistance to 
alleviate the desperate state of the Puerto Rican economy, and to spend its funds on direct relief 
or work relief. PRERA was soon followed by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration 
(PRRA), created to implement the proposals in the report produced by the Puerto Rico Policy 
Commission in 1934, known as the Chardón Plan.23  
Among the many activities undertaken by the PRRA, one was of special relevance to our 
study: the construction of a cement plant, the Puerto Rico Cement Company. Ernest Gruening, 
Director of Territories in the Federal Government and Administrator of the PRRA, had pushed 
strongly for the project of building a cement factory on the island since the mid 1930s.
24 At that 
time, cement production in the US was falling behind demand, because of the implementation of 
several  Federal  programs,  and  particularly  the  Federal  Housing  Authority.  Because  of  this, 
cement prices in Puerto Rico were growing rapidly.
25 As the island’s government lacked the 
                                                 
22 Several specific differences existed, nonetheless. For instance, the federal regulation on minimum wage was not 
binding in Puerto Rico after 1940, because of the disastrous consequences caused by the initial application to the 
island of the earliest Federal minimum wage law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, approved in 1938 (Ross, The Long 
Uphill Path, pp. 42 43). Also, the island taxpayers were exempt from paying Federal Income Tax. Correspondingly, 
Puerto Rico did not automatically benefit from the Federal Programs of public expenditure. 
23 After the name of Carlos Chardón, Chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico. Ross, The Long Uphill Path, pp. 
28 39, provides details on PRERA and its inheritor agency, the PPRA. 
24 Mathews, Puerto Rican Politics, p. 242. 
25 In the island the price of cement increased by 67% through the 1930’s, from US$1.75 per barrel (average price 
between 1930 and 1935) to US$2.92 in 1939 (Baralt, La vida, pp. 123 124). Regarding the decision to build a cement 
plan in Puerto Rico, Rodríguez Beruff (Strategy, p. 366), emphasizes as well the importance of the preparations for 
war and the strategic character of Puerto Rico, which led to the building of large military facilities in the island.   
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funds to build the cement plant, the PRRA undertook the enterprise with federal funds.
26 The 
Puerto Rico Cement began commercial operations in January 1939, and became the first non 
agricultural heavy industry in Puerto Rico. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE SECTOR  
A crucial change came with the appointment of Rexford G. Tugwell as Governor of Puerto Rico 
in  September  1941.  A  former  professor  at  Columbia  University,  Tugwell  had  served  as 
Undersecretary in the Department of Agriculture in Roosevelt’s first New Deal Government. At 
that time, he had visited Puerto Rico, and on his return he prepared a report for President 
Roosevelt, in April 1934. Among other proposals, the report included two of special interest 
here: (1) The possibility of socializing the sugar industry in Puerto Rico, and running it by means 
of a government corporation; and (2) the establishment of light domestic industries: bottles, 
cement, rayon, cellulose products, sugar refining, rum, and furniture.
27 Indeed, Tugwell’s view of 
the  transformation  of  Puerto  Rico  was  that  industrialization  would  not  occur  unless  the 
government took the initiative. This continued to be his approach when he became Governor at 
the end of the summer 1941; throughout his tenure, he made concerted efforts to promote a 
policy of government induced industrialization.
28 Indeed, Tugwell made his intentions very clear 
in his earliest speeches to the Puerto Rico Legislature.
29  
On November 18, 1941, Tugwell appointed Teodoro Moscoso as coordinator of the island’s 
affairs,  and  his  only  Spanish speaking  aide.  Moscoso  was  to  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
industrialization program soon to begin.
30 To improve Tugwell’s relationship with the Puerto 
                                                 
26 Maldonado, Teodoro Moscoso, p. 27. 
27 Matthew, Puerto Rican Politics, p. 162.  
28 Tugwell, “What next for Puerto Rico”, p. 147. 
29 Tugwell, Message to the Fifteenth Legislature, p. 58. 
30 Maldonado, Teodoro Moscoso, provides a detailed and excellent account of Moscoso’s key role in the Puerto Rico 
public policy in that period.   
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Rico Legislature, he forged an alliance with Luis Muñoz Marín,
31 who had obtained the powerful 
position of President of the Senate (the highest post that a Puerto Rican politician could hold) 
after  the  November  1940  election.  In  the  1940  electoral  campaign  Muñoz  Marín’s  Partido 
Popular Democrático (PPD) had pledged to place primary emphasis on the issues related to 
economic reform, instead of the traditional discussion of the island’s political status. A majority 
in the Legislature was in favor of economic reform,
32 and Tugwell was able to pass the legislation 
required to create the legal framework for the government induced industrialization policy. The 
key step was the approval by Act No. 188 (May 11, 1942) of the Law of the Development 
Company. According to Tugwell: “Intentions with the law for the Development Company were 
clearer at outset…. wide authorization to go into business was provided.”
33  
The Puerto Rico Development Company (PRDC henceforth; in 1946 it was renamed the 
Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, PRIDCO thereafter) was organized following 
the lines of the Chilean Development Company, which had been created several years before.
34 
Moscoso  was  appointed  general  manager  of  the  PRDC  on  September  30,  1942,  and  the 
company began operating in October. Its first and main factory was the cement plant, with assets 
of around US$2,000,000.
35 The common stock participation of the island’s government in this 
                                                 
31 Carr, Puerto Rico, pp. 65 66; Goldsmith, Clavel and Roth, “A bibliography”, 144; Maldonado, “Tugwell”, p. 3. 
32 However, the margin of the PPD’s victory in 1940 was extremely narrow. The PPD obtained a majority of one 
vote in the Senate. In the lower house, the PPD and the Coalition between the Republican Party (pro statehood) 
and the Socialist Party obtained 16 seats each. A third party, Unification (Liberal), gained three. Data on Senatorial 
and Representative Districts for 1940 (as well as for 1944 and 1948, below) have been obtained from the Biblioteca 
Virtual de Puerto Rico (http://eleccionespuertorico.org/mapas/index_es.html, accessed on June 2, 2009).  
33 Tugwell, The stricken land, p. 263. 
34 Moscoso, “Industrial development”, p. 60. 
35 PRDC, Annual Report 1944, p. 30.  
 
10
venture was transferred to PRDC in late 1943,
36 and thereafter the federal participation was paid 
in full out of the profits.
37  
Besides PRDC, two other key agencies for the development program were created in 1942: 
the Puerto Rico Planning Board, and the Government Development Bank. Other sector related 
agencies  were  created  between  1941  and  1945:
38  The  Water  Resources  Authority,
39  the 
Transportation Authority, the Communications Authority, the Insular Sewerage Service, and the 
Puerto Rico Aqueduct Service.
40 Thus, the institutional framework needed to develop the policy 
of government induced industrialization had been put in place.  
It should be stressed that all public enterprises established by the Tugwell administration 
were organized as independent public corporations; they were legally incorporated, intended to 
be  financially  self sufficient,  and  were  administratively  outside  the  regular  departments  and 
agencies  of  the  bureaucracy.
41  In  line  with  this  modern  approach  to  public  management  of 
commercial firms, Moscoso – the general manager of the PRDC – worked hard to make the 
PRDC’s operations profitable, and soon demanded that services that were provided free should 
be separated from the company’s general services.
42 
                                                 
36 Descartes, Financing Economic Development, p. 4. 
37 Moscoso, “Industrial development”, p. 60. 
38 Baer, “Puerto Rico”, p. 647. 
39  This  agency,  which  produced  electric  power,  was  created  before  Tugwell  was  appointed  Governor  (Dietz, 
Economic History, p. 187). 
40 These last two concerns merged in 1945 forming the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (Goodsell, Administration of a 
revolution, p. 189). 
41 Goodsell, Administration of a revolution, p. 183. 
42 Moscoso, Letter to Rexford Tugwell, June 30, 1945. Muñoz Marín soon endorsed Moscoso’s view. In a speech 
broadcast on  August 20, 1945 (“Sobre las empresas  públicas y el desarrollo de las estructuras económicas del 
gobierno de Puerto Rico”), he stated that activities employing workers must be split in two parts: (1) private and 
government owned firms (being the functioning and financing of these last ones similar to that of the private firms); 
and (2) the properly governmental services, paid for with fiscal revenues (Muñoz Marín, Palabras, p. 87).   
 
11
In the following years, the newly created agencies took over several privately owned utilities. 
In January 1944 the Puerto Rico Water Resource Authority took over the Puerto Rico Railway 
Light  and  Power  Company  and  the  Mayagüez  Light  Power  and  Ice  Company,  bringing  all 
electric power utilities in Puerto Rico under its control.
43 Later the Transportation Authority 
took over the urban transport system in San Juan, as the private system was collapsing and no 
private group was in a position to revive it.
44 Even though it took longer to implement, this 
policy can be seen as similar to the ones applied in many US states and municipalities in the late 
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  a  period  characterized  by  a  progressively  greater 
involvement of governments in the delivery of local services.
45 Indeed, in that period there was a 
noticeable trend toward increased public ownership of local energy suppliers,
46 municipal water 
networks,
47 and solid waste collection suppliers.
48 
What was really exceptional in the Puerto Rico economic policy in the 1940s was the fact that 
the  PRDC  created  new  manufacturing  plants,  which  were  built  and  run  by  government 
corporations. Soon after the PRDC began operating, the decision was taken to build a glass 
container  factory,  and  the  Puerto  Rico  Glass  Corporation  (PR  Glass,  henceforth)  was 
incorporated on February 24, 1943.
49 The construction of the glass factory began in May 1943, 
and the forecast cost was US$2,000,000.
50 After a total investment of US$3,026,000, much higher 
                                                 
43 Lugo Silva, The Tugwell Administration, pp. 83 84; Richardson, Puerto Rican, p. 113. 
44 Tugwell, Message to the Sixteenth Legislature, p. 44. 
45 Gómez Ibáñez, Regulating infrastructure. 
46 Troesken and Geddes, “Municipalizing American waterworks”, p. 376. 
47 Gómez Ibáñez, Regulating infrastructure, p. 160. 
48 Melosi, Garbage in the cities, p. 154. 
49 PRDC, Annual Report 1944, p. 13. 
50 PR Government, Forty-Third Annual Report, p. 47.  
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than expected, glass production began in January 1945, but production was stopped due a strike 
which began in February and lasted until June 25, 1945.
51 
The  Puerto  Rico  Pulp  and  Paper  Corporation  (PR  Pulp  and  Paper,  henceforth)  was 
organized on April 23, 1944.
52 In the same month a contract was awarded for the building of a 
paper  mill,  with  a  budget  of  US$1,200,000.
53  Construction  began  in  May  1944  and  the 
production of paperboard began on May 6, 1946,
54 after US$1,504,436 had been invested.
55 
The Puerto Rico Clay Products Corporation (PR Clay Products, henceforth) was created on 
November 6 1944;
56 the preliminary work for building the clay products factory was completed 
by June 1945, and the funds available for use by this company amounted to U$247,504.75.
57 The 
first kiln was completed in May 1947 and production of brick and hollow tile began in August 
1947. In this case, again, the cost was much higher than expected: total investment by June 30, 
1947 was US$1,140,595.
58 
The fifth subsidiary to be incorporated was the Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation 
(PR Shoe and Leather, henceforth), in January 1946. The plant opened (although construction 
was still incomplete) on July 1, 1946, and commercial operations began in February 1947.
59 Total 
investment amounted to US$319,247.
60 
                                                 
51 PR Government, Forty-Fifth Annual Report, p. 30. 
52 PRDC, Annual Report 1944, p. 13. 
53 PR Government, Forty-Fourth Annual Report, p. 31. 
54 PR Government, Forty-Sixth Annual Report, p. 39. 
55 PRIDCO, Annual Report 1947, p. 27. 
56 PRDC, Annual Report 1944, p. 13. 
57 PR Government, Forty-Fifth Annual Report, p. 31. 
58 PRIDCO, Annual Report 1947, p. 31. 
59 PRIDCO, Annual Report 1947, p. 16. 
60 PRIDCO, Annual Report 1947, p. 30.  
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Interestingly, the Forty-Sixth Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, the last one delivered 
under Tugwell’s governorship, included Telares de Puerto Rico, inc. (PR Telares, henceforth) 
among  the  subsidiary  manufacturing  corporations  that  had  been  created  (this  one  being  the 
sixth), and announced that work at PR Telares was scheduled to start before the end of 1946.
61 
Indeed, plans were completed for a modern textile factory to produce for the local market.
62 But 
the plant was never built to be managed by PR Telares,
63 and this subsidiary was dissolved on 
June 30, 1951.
64 
Table 1 provides details of PRIDCO’s six subsidiary corporations. Total direct investment of 
PRIDCO in the subsidiary plants until June 30, 1949 was US11.1 million,
65 a large financial 
commitment. However, PRIDCO plants were capital intensive and they employed relatively few 
workers:  in  June  1948,  when  all  plants  were  in  operation,  the  total  work  force  was  992 
employees.
66 In fact, the creation of the manufacturing state owned sector in Puerto Rico seems 
to  have  had  a  minimal  effect  on  industrial  employment  –  far  below  what  an  effective 
industrialization policy for the island might have been expected to achieve.  
 
                                                 
61 PR Government, Forty-Sixth Annual Report, p. 38. 
62 Moscoso, “Industrial development”, p. 61. 
63 The plant was only constructed when arrangements had been made for it to operate under a lease contract by a 
US textile firm (Ross, The Long Uphill Path, p. 74). 
64 The total deficit accumulated until PR Telares was liquidated was US$86,000 (PRIDCO, Annual Report 1951, p. 
27). 
65 Descartes, Financing Economic Development, p. 31. 
66 Moscoso, Letter to Luis Muñoz Marín, June 24, 1948.  
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Table 1. PRIDCO manufacturing corporations: organization, operations, initial investment, work force.  









as of June 
1948 
Puerto Rico Cement Corporation  February 1938
a  January 1939  1,500,000  156 
Puerto Rico Glass Corporation  February 1943  January 1945  3,026,000  176 
Puerto Rico Pulp and Paper Corporation  April 1944  May 1946  1,504,436  173 
Puerto Rico Clay Products Corporation  November 1944  August 1947  1,140,595  205 
Puerto Rico Shoe and Leather Corporation  January 1946  February 1947  319,247  282 
Telares de Puerto Rico, inc.  Early 1946  Never  86,000
b    
Notes: 
a The Cement plant was acquired by PRDC in 1943, with assets near to US$2,000,000. 
      
b The amount for Telares de Puerto Rico, inc. is the deficit accumulated by June 30, 1951. 
Sources: Author, based on: (a) PRDC Annual Report 1944; (b) PRIDCO, Annual Reports 1947, and 1951; (c) PR 
Government, Forty-Fifth, and Forty-Sixth. Work force: Moscoso, Letter to Luis Muñoz Marín, June 24, 1948. 
 
 
PRIVATIZATION OF THE STATE-OWNED MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
On February 12, 1946, Tugwell delivered his last Governor’s Message to the Legislature. A large 
part of his speech was dedicated to the publicly owned firms and utilities. He claimed that one of 
the reasons for the success in the ownership and operation of public utilities was the fact that 
they had been organized as corporations that were legally independent from the government. 
This allowed them to operate as business organizations, without interference from bureaucratic 
procedures.
67 Tugwell concluded as follows: “It is with some emotion that I tell you at the 
opening of this regular session of my approaching departure….I have already noted some of the 
credits, the largest being the program for economic rehabilitation which has been begun. And 
next, perhaps, the public ownership and operation of public utilities”.
68 The 46
th Annual Report 
(1945 46) was the last one delivered by Tugwell, and soon Jesús T. Piñero, the first native Puerto 
Rican Governor, replaced him.  
  Piñero was the last Governor appointed by the US President. Interestingly, Muñoz Marín –
then still President of the Senate – had been offered the governorship, but he preferred to wait 
until the first gubernatorial election, scheduled for November 1948. Following Muñoz Marín’s 
suggestion, Piñero, a PPD member, was appointed to the office. In any case, thereafter Muñoz 
                                                 
67 Tugwell, Message to the Sixteenth Legislature, p. 48. 
68 Tugwell, Message to the Sixteenth Legislature, p. 49.  
 
15
Marín held total command of the executive power in Puerto Rico, adding this to the full control 
PPD had obtained over the Legislature. Whereas the PPD had won the 1940 election to the 
Legislature by a very narrow margin, the 1944 election had produced the largest victory in the 
history  of  Puerto  Rico:  the  PPD  took  all  seven  Senatorial  districts  and  34  of  the  35 
Representative districts, thus gaining full control of the Legislature.  
  Together  with  these  institutional  changes,  the  economic  environment  had  dramatically 
changed  as  well  after  the  end  of  World  War  II.  Maritime  transportation  and  trade  in  the 
Caribbean  Sea  progressively  returned  to  normal,  thus  increasing  the  competition  facing  the 
commercial products manufactured in the island. This change was of great importance, because 
most government owned manufacturing firms had been designed to supply the local market;
69 by 
the  time  all  five  subsidiaries  were  finally  in  full  commercial  operation  in  1947,  the  market 
conditions on the island had changed dramatically. Besides, technical and commercial problems 
had seriously affected the performance of some of the subsidiaries, especially the PR Pulp and 
Paper C., and the PR Shoe and Leather C.
70 
  All  these  developments  had  a  strong  influence  on  the  Puerto  Rico  government,  which 
expressed its official views in the Annual Reports to the Legislature (see table 2). Tugwell’s 
Reports  (1941 1946)  had  continuously  supported  the  increasing  role  of  the  government  in 
manufacturing.  Projects  were  expanding  each  year,  and  strong  emphasis  was  put  on  the 
development of the factories, although the difficulties faced were also mentioned, related above 
all to labor conflicts and extra costs of investments. 
 
 
                                                 
69 Moscoso, “Industrial development”, p. 61. 
70  Detailed  accounts  of  the  problems  faced  by  these  subsidiaries  can  be  found  in  Moscoso,  “Industrial 
Development”, p. 61, and Ross, The Long Uphill Path, pp. 64 73.   
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Table 2. The state owned enterprise sector in Puerto Rico Governors’ Annual Reports  AR . 
Report   Governor  SOEs in the Governor’s Annual Report  Emphasis 
43rd AR 1943  Tugwell  PR Glass C. is an already undertaken project. Expected investment 
is US$2,000,000. Other projects under consideration: (1) plant for 
the manufacture of wall board; (2) textile mill; (3) hosiery kitting 
mill; (4) paper mill; (5) yeast plants; (6) plant for the production of 





44th AR 1944  Tugwell  Virtual completion of the glass container plant, with a total 
investment of US$2,276,890. Creation of the PR Pulp and Paper C., 
and the beginning of construction of a paper mill in May 1944. 
Expected cost to be US$1,200,000. 
Building cost of 
the glass container 
plant 14% above 
expectations. 
45th AR 1945  Tugwell  Glass production began in January 1945; a strike in February 
stopped production for 86 days. Building of the paperboard mill 
was repeatedly held up by delays in delivery of construction material 
and machinery; total capital stock issued amounted to 
US$1,325,000. The PR Clay Products C. was organized late in 1944; 
funds available for use by amount to U$247,504.75. Plans under 
consideration by the Research and Development Department 
include plants for making wallboard, cotton cloth, food yeast, 
shoes, vegetable oils, and meat packing. 
Paper mill costs 
more than 10% 
above expected. 




ambitious plans to 
be implemented. 
46th AR 1946  Tugwell  By the end of the fiscal year, PRIDCO had six subsidiary 
corporations: PR Glass C., PR Cement C., PR Pulp and Paper C., 
PT Clay Products C., PR Shoes and Lather C., and Telares de PR. 
Glass, Cement and Pulp and Paper were in operation, Clay, and 
Shoe and Leather were under construction; construction of Telares 
was expected to start by the end of 1946.  
Three subsidiaries 
working, and two 
plants being built. 
Construction of 
Telares scheduled.  
47th AR 1947  Piñero   The PR Shoe and Leather C. went into operation, and the 
subsidiary to manufacture heavy clay products had successful test 
runs. All of the foregoing contributes to the fulfillment of the basic 
program approved by the Insular Governmentgovernment when 
PRDC was founded in 1942. To achieve this end the company has 
developed basic industries such as cement, glass, clay products, 
paper and shoes. The Company has scheduled construction of a 
new textile mill in Ponce which will employ more than 500 persons, 
and has contracted for the building of a yeast pilot plant capable of 
producing 1,000 pounds of dry yeast daily. 
Four subsidiaries 
working, and one 







48th AR 1948  Piñero  PRIDCO has laid special emphasis on two important aspects of the 
long range program: encouragement of private industrial enterprise 
and the development of tourism as a source of income to the 
island. 




49th AR 1949  Muñoz 
Marín 
The PRIDC program began with the acquisition of a cement plant, 
and later the creation of four other industrial plants, three of which 
showed signs of becoming profitable ventures. PR Glass., PR Clay., 
PR Shoe and Leather, and PR Pulp and Paper all operated at a loss. 
The solution to the difficulties of this plant [Pulp and Paper] 
appeared either to be to adapt it to the manufacture of cardboard or 
to sell it to private interests who would make an integrated 
enterprise. 
Privatization of PR 
Pulp and Paper C. 
envisaged as a 
likely solution for 
its difficulties. 
50th AR 1950  Muñoz 
Marín 
During the year Joyce of Puerto Rico, a subsidiary of Joyce Inc. of 
California, leased the PRIDCO’s shoe factory at Ponce. The PR 
Clay C. and the PR. Glass C. operated at a loss. Production by the 
Cement Corporation was interrupted by a 50 day strike which 
caused a sharp drop in earnings. The plant had a net profit of 
US$758,000 compared with the last year’s US$1,271,000. 
PR Shoe and 
Leather C. was 
privatized. Most 
plants operated at 
a loss, and PR 
Cement C. profits 
decreased . 
Note: Fiscal years July 1 to June 30. 
Source: Author, based on PR Government (43rd, p. 47; 44th, p. 31; 45th, pp. 30 31; 46th, pp. 38 39; 47th, pp. 93 97; 
48th, p. 60; 49th, pp. 60 65; and 50th, pp. 88 90).  
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  The 47
th Report (1946 47), delivered by Piñero, differed little from Tugwell’s last report. 
However, the following report (that of 1947 48) explicitly stated that PRIDCO had turned its 
attention  to  two  important  aspects  of  the  long range  program:  encouragement  of  private 
industrial  enterprise,  and  the  development  of  tourism  as  a  source  of  income  for  the  island. 
Publicly managed manufacturing firms received much less attention in the report, thus providing 
a clear signal that a reorientation of the development policy was underway. 
  Interestingly,  the  49
th  Report  (1948 1949),  the  first  one  delivered  by  Muñoz  Marín, 
openly admitted that selling the PR Pulp and Paper C. to private interests could be a solution for 
its problems. In his second Governor’s Report (50
th, 1949 1950), Muñoz Marín emphasized that 
the PR Shoe and Leather C. had been privatized, that most PRIDCO plants were operating at a 
loss, and that profits were falling in the only profitable firm, the PR Cement C. By then, the 
question of privatization had irreversibly entered the fray. 
 Although contemporary studies claimed that 1948 was the year in which the decision to sell 
the subsidiaries was first made,
71 the possibility of privatization was already being discussed by 
PRIDCO iny mid 1947. At a meeting of the PRIDCO Planning and Executive Committees held 
on  May  30,  1947,  Moscoso  reported  on  negotiations  held  during  a  recent  trip  to  the  US 
regarding the transfer of the shoe factory to a private firm: “2. Shoe factory – It was reported 
that Mr. Weinbrot of the Mercury Footwear reiterated its willingness to consider renting the 
shoe factory of the Company. The President [Moscoso] stated that a letter to that effect should 
be obtained from Mr. Weinbrot but that it would be preferable to negotiate along these lines 
with  either  Penaljo  or  Joyce,  two  other  reputable  shoe  manufacturers  of  apparently  higher 
standards.”
72 In fact, the shoe and leather factory was sold to Joyce of California in October 
                                                 
71 Ross, The Long Uphill Path, p. 111. 
72 PRIDCO, Minutes of the meeting. Muñoz Marín was well aware of this, since a copy of these Minutes was sent to 
him, as usual.  
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1949.  However,  more  negotiations  were  needed  before  the  privatization  policy  could  finally 
proceed. 
As early as May 1948,
73 PRIDCO received an offer to buy all its five operating subsidiaries, 
from  a  group  headed  by  Royal  Little,  President  of  Textron.  This  proposal  divided  the 
subsidiaries into two groups – one formed by the cement plant, and the other formed by the 
remaining four. The proposal included: (1) payments in cash for prepaid items and inventories: 
(2) the payment of US$3,000,000 in cash for the cement plant (or alternatively a lease for six 
years at a rental of US$500,000 per year, and US$100,000 per year thereafter for 93 years); and 
(3) the payment of the depreciated value of the four other plants over ten years with 3% interest 
payable  quarterly.
74  This  proposal  would  have  resulted  in  a  payment  well  below  the  net 
investment made by PRIDCO in the five subsidiaries, which had been set as the minimum sum 
to be met for the approval of any sale. Accordingly, the proposal was turned down.  
Even though the Puerto Rico government would not make any official statement on its 
willingness to privatize PRIDCO subsidiaries before the gubernatorial election of November 
1948, the question of privatization was debated publicly. In early July 1948, Luis Ferré, one of 
the leaders of the Statehood Party (and a member of the Ferré Group, a family industrial holding 
that would be crucial later in the sale of the subsidiaries) made a public statement asking that the 
firms be sold by an auction, in which Puerto Rican firms should participate.
75  
New proposals for the acquisition of the subsidiaries were soon forthcoming. Following a 
conversation held with Moscoso on February 1, 1949, David G. Baird (Vice President of Marsh 
& McLennan Inc.) sent PRIDCO a formal bid to buy the cement, glass, paper, and clay product 
                                                 
73 That is, long before the proposal for the acquisition of the paperboard plant made by Karl F. Landegger by the 
end of 1949, which is considered by Ross (The Long Uphill Path, p. 115) as the first formal proposal to buy a 
PRIDCO subsidiary. 
74 PRIDCO, Proposal for the sale of subsidiaries. All the details of the proposal can be found in this PRIDCO Internal 
Memorandum. 




76 One week later, on February 7, 1949, Moscoso sent copies of Baird’s letters to 
PRIDCO’s Board of Directors, together with a Memorandum stating his opinion that “it is an 
operation to be studied in detail.…I want to let you know in advance that our recommendation 
will probably be to ask for a higher amount regarding the ‘going concern value’ of all plants. 
Perhaps  one  or  two  million  dollars  in  addition  to  the  million  offered.  Furthermore,  the 
accumulated deficits must be absorbed by the company that buys the plants”.
77  
No agreement was reached between PRIDCO and Baird, but the subsidiaries would soon be 
privatized. In October 1949, PRIDCO sold the PR Shoe and Leather C. to Joyce de Puerto Rico, 
Inc., a subsidiary of Joyce California. Joyce purchased the machinery for US$35,000.
78 More 
importantly, at the end of 1949 the New York businessman Karl F. Landegger showed interest in 
acquiring the paper plant. Later, in July 1950, he submitted a formal bid for the acquisition of all 
four  subsidiaries  still  under  PRIDCO  ownership  (cement,  glass,  paper,  clay  products).  The 
nominal  price  he  offered  was  US$10,000,000,  to  be  paid  in  ten  years.  However,  Landegger 
offered only US$2,000,000 as down payment and an interest free mortgage.
79 Although the total 
amount offered was close to the book value of the plants, the interest free mortgage made the 
proposal far less attractive, and PRIDCO did not accept it.  
The  final  step  was  in  late  September  1950,  when  the  Puerto  Rican  Ferré  Group 
unexpectedly
80 offered US$10,500,000, to be paid as follows: a down payment of US$2,000,000, 
                                                 
76 Details of this proposal can be found in Baird, Letter to PRIDCO.  
77 PRIDCO, Memorandum from Teodoro Moscoso (Author’s translation). 
78 Joyce agreed to add at least US$65,000 worth of additional machinery, and took over the factory building on a 
lease basis (PRIDCO, Annual Report 1950, p. 36). Full details of the operations can be found in PRIDCO, Annual 
Report 1950, p. 20. 
79 See further details of Landegger’s proposal in Ross, The Long Uphill Path, 115. 
80 While PRIDCO was still considering the possibility of selling the firms to Landegger if he improved his offer, the 
Ferré  Group  asked  Martin  Muñoz  to  withhold  any  final  decision  until  that  holding  could  make  an  offer  for 
PRIDCO subsidiaries; Muñoz complied with this request (Muñoz Marín, Memorias, p. 252).  
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3.5% preferred stock of another US$2,000,000, and a 4% first mortgage of US$6,500,000.
81 This 
proposal was the first to meet PRIDCO’s demands in full, and an agreement was reached less 
than one week after intense negotiations between the technical teams of PRIDCO and the Ferré 
Group to work out the details.
82 On October 3, the official agreement to sell the cement, glass, 
paper and clay products companies to the Ferré Group was publicly announced.
83 
The  total  amount  agreed  for  the  sale,  US$10,500,000,  slightly  above  the  book value  of 
PRIDCO’s subsidiaries.
84 PRIDCO saw the operation as a “commercial deal which, from the 
point of view of valuations and economic consequences involved, may be classified among the 
most important ever made in the history of Puerto Rico.”
85 The quantitative significance of the 
sale can hardly be underrated. Proceeds from privatization amounted to 9.3% of fiscal receipts 
for island’s government purposes, and to 1.4% of Puerto Rico’s total Gross Product in 1950.
86 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTIVES OF PRIVATIZATION IN PUERTO RICO 
Contemporary  authors  paid  little  attention  to  the  reasons  why  the  Puerto  Rico  government 
privatized the manufacturing firms under its ownership. In 1954, a few years after privatization 
had been implemented, Ojuda emphasized the economic and technical difficulties faced by most 
subsidiaries in undertaking successful operations (such as the market dimension, and changes in 
                                                 
81  Taking  everything  into  account,  the  Ferrés  proposal  amounted  to  US$3,000,000  over  the  bid  offered  by 
Landegger (Ross, The Long Uphill Path, p. 116).  
82 Maldonado, Teodoro Moscoso, 65 68, offers a vivid account of this negotiation process.  
83 El Mundo, October 4, 1950, pp. 1 and 15; El Imparcial, October 4, 1950, pp. 2 and 34. 
84  Notice  that  the  PR  Shoe  and  Leather  had  already  been  sold  to  Joyce  in  November  1949,  well  before  this 
agreement was reached.  
85 PRIDCO, Annual Report 1951, p. 15 (Author’s translation). The recovery of the capital used to establish the firms 
was later confirmed by Puerto Rico Planning Board, Informe económico, p. 38. 
86 I have made these computations based on the data in Puerto Rico Planning Board, Economic development, on Fiscal 
receipts (p. 79, table 46), and Gross Product (p. 162, appendix table 14).  
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the economic environment with the resumption of trade) as drivers of the sale.
87 However, in an 
article published in 1955, Lewis stressed managerial incapacity as one of the reasons for the sale, 
as well as the view that government owned firms would produce a dangerous increase in the 
island’s wage structure because they were paying higher wages than private firms.
88 Two years 
later, in 1957, Ross refuted Lewis’s views by emphasizing that managerial incapacity was not an 
issue in the sale; Ross’s reasoning was more in line with Ojuda’s vision that the sale of the 
subsidiaries  was  due  to  problems  related  to  the  dimension  of  the  local  market  and  to  the 
economic  environment.
89  More  recent  studies  of  the  Puerto  Rican  economy  have  not  paid 
further attention to the reasons for privatization, and the economic analysis of privatization in 
recent decades ignores the Puerto Rican case entirely. 
The analyses of more recent privatization experiences in the fields of economics and public 
policy have shown that privatization policies may pursue a multiplicity of objectives, among 
which three types stand out: Ideological motivations, political interests, and economic objectives 
(either financial or efficiency related). By using these concepts and tools, a deeper and more 
systematic analysis of the objectives of privatization in Puerto Rico can be undertaken. 
Ideology played an important role in the building of the state owned enterprise sector in 
Puerto Rico. In line with the belief that was common in the late 1930s and early 1940s that 
private initiative would not effectively engage in the industrialization of Puerto Rico, Rexford 
Tugwell was firmly convinced of the importance of public intervention in the economy. Tugwell 
held important posts in the US Department of Agriculture in the mid 1930s, and the proposals 
he tried to put forward won him the nickname ‘Rex the Red’.
90 Indeed, Tugwell’s faith in public 
corporations and state financed industry was one of the main drivers of the creation of the SOE 
                                                 
87 Ojuda, The industrial development program, pp. 161 162 
88 Lewis, “Puerto Rico”, pp. 625 627. 
89 Ross, “Gordon Lewis”, pp. 88 89. These views were further developed in Ross, The Long Uphill Path, pp. 108 117.  
90 Goodsell, Administration of a revolution, p. 165: Carr, Puerto Rico, p. 67.  
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sector in Puerto Rico.
91 To achieve his objective, Tugwell enlisted the support of Martín Muñoz, 
the leading local politician, and Moscoso, who became the leading local public servant in the 
industrial sector. However, Tugwell’s views on industrialization were substantially to the left of 
those held by Muñoz and Moscoso.
92 Indeed, the fact that Tugwell left the governorship in 1946 
was seen as one of the factors that made possible the industrial policy reorientation initiated after 
1947.
93 
Particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  Muñoz  Marín’s  views  on  the  issue  of  public 
intervention and industrial development, because – besides being President of the Senate– he 
was also the undisputed leader of the PPD, and policy decisions were heavily dependent on him, 
particularly after Tugwell left Puerto Rico in 1946. The fact that Muñoz Marín did not share 
Tugwell’s  faith  in  nationalization  is  reflected  in  their  disagreement  over  the  uncompleted 
nationalization of the private telecommunications company. Nationalizing telecommunications 
was one of Tugwell’s most cherished projects, but it failed because of the lack of support from 
Muñoz  Marín.  In  1947,  Tugwell’s  public  criticism  of  Muñoz  Marín’s  position  on  the 
expropriation of telecommunications sparked fierce controversy. In a speech broadcast on 27 
March, 1947, Muñoz Marín responded “I believe that investment of public funds directed to 
create  more  sources  of  production,  or  to  stimulate  them,  should  have  priority  over  public 
investments…merely directed to transfer property …I have never believed in the wisdom of 
investing public funds to merely transfer ownership to the government.” 
94 
 More on Muñoz Marín’s views on the private versus public debate in economics can be 
learnt from a speech given on the eve of the first election for Governor, in November 1948, 
                                                 
91 Carr, Puerto Rico, p. 65. 
92 Goodsell, Administration of a revolution, p. 190. 
93 Ross, The Long Uphill Path, p. 79.  




when he stated that
95 “Men in the entire world fight, some defending private initiative, others 
defending that government must make all….We cannot be doctrinaire …. The Puerto Rican 
government  works  based  on  both  doctrines;  applying  whichever  one  is  more  helpful  in  a 
particular moment. The government has made stated owned factories. But it has helped to make 
many  more  private  factories  ….we  are  neither  theoretical  nor  doctrinaire.”  Indeed,  the 
privatization  policy  itself  provides  clear  proof  that  it  did  not  emerge  out  of  any  ideological 
conviction concerning the systematic superiority of private ownership; not one agency owning 
and  operating  public  utilities  or  other  network  services  (such  as  electricity,  water,  or  urban 
transportation) was privatized either between 1948 and 1950, or in the rest of Muñoz Marín’s 
tenure, which ended in 1964. 
We should now turn our attention to the question of whether political interests might have 
been  the  drivers  of  the  privatization  policy.  Recent  theoretical  literature  has  shown  that 
governments can design and implement privatization to foster their partisan political interests.96 
Furthermore, the privatization policy that preceded the one implemented in Puerto Rico – the 
large scale sale of government owned enterprises in Germany between 1934 and 1937 – had 
political objectives as one of its main drivers (together with financial motivations). The Nazi 
government had come to power with limited parliamentary support
97 and faced great difficulty in 
                                                 
95 Muñoz Marín, “Mi propósito es que el pueblo resuelva los difíciles problemas de su vida”, pp. 660 661 (in Muñoz 
Marín, Palabras, pp. 644 667) [author’s translation]. 
96 See Biais and Perotti, “Machiavellian privatization”, and Perotti, “Credible privatization”, for theoretical analyses; 
see Bel and Fageda, “Factors explaining”, and Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco, “Privatisation around the World”, 
for empirical information.  
97 When Hitler was appointed Chancellor in January 1933, the Nazi party had just 196 out of 584 seats (33.6%) in 
the German Parliament. In the following election of March 1933, the Nazis obtained 44.5% of the seats (Bel, 
“Against the mainstream”)  
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achieving stable support; it therefore used privatization as a tool to foster alliances with the great 
industrialists, as privatization was a policy favorable to private property.
98 
In Puerto Rico, however, there was no comparable scenario of political weakness and limited 
parliamentary  support  when  the  privatization  program  was  implemented.  In  the  first 
gubernatorial election ever held, in 1948, Muñoz Marín obtained 61.2% of the votes, and became 
the first elected Governor of Puerto Rico. The second most voted candidate (belonging to a 
coalition  of  the  Statehood  Party,  the  Socialist  Party,  and  the  Reformist  Party)  obtained  just 
28.6% of votes, and the third candidate (the Independence Party) received 10.2%.
99 As regards 
the  elections  to  the  Legislature,  Muñoz  Marín’s  PPD  won  all  Senatorial  and  Representative 
districts.  Muñoz  Marín  now  held  absolute  control  of  both  the  executive  and  the  legislative 
branches, and he had no need to give priority to new coalition building when designing and 
implementing his industrial policies.  
Besides  the  government’s  political  strength  in  1948,  there  is  another  striking  factor  that 
makes the Puerto Rico experience very different from other large scale privatization processes 
implemented to favor business and political elites and to benefit the government’s allies, as in the 
case of Nazi Germany
100 or post communist Russia.
101 The fact is that most of the privatized 
firms (cement, glass, paper, and clay products) were sold to the Ferré Group, a family holding 
run by several brothers. One of the brothers was Luís Ferré, a very important figure in the 
Statehood Party, and a long standing opponent of the government’s economic policy.
102 At no 
                                                 
98 Bel, “Against the mainstream”. 
99 Data on the gubernatorial elections have been obtained from the Comisión Estatal de Elecciones of Puerto Rico 
(http://www.ceepur.org/ , accessed on June 2, 2009). 
100  See  Sweezy,  The  Structure  of  the  Nazi,  p.  27;  Merlin,  “Trends  in  German”  p.  207;  and  Bel,  “Against  the 
mainstream”.  
101 See Desai, “Russian Retrospectives”, p. 97; Guriev and Rachinski, “The Role of Oligarchs”, pp. 138 139.  
102 In 1968, Luís Ferré became the first non PPD Governor of Puerto Rico, after twenty years of PPD dominance 
(Muñoz Marín between 1948 and 1964, and Sánchez Vilella between 1964 and 1968).   
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other time in the history of privatization has a government sold the bulk of the state owned 
manufacturing sector to an opposition political leader. This clearly shows that the sale of the 
PRIDCO  subsidiaries  in  Puerto  Rico  was  far  from  being  a  story  of  crony  capitalism  or  of 
transferring government ownership to close political allies in order to foster the government’s 
political interests. 
Given that ideological biases and partisan political interests did not play a relevant role in 
privatization in Puerto Rico, the island’s government might have used privatization to advance 
its economic policy. In this connection, we should mention the fact that financial restrictions in 
the  Treasury  (a  key  factor  in  most  privatization  policies)103  did  not  seem  to  play  a  role  in 
privatization in Puerto Rico. The public debt of the island’s government fell steadily throughout 
the 1940s, from US$27.2 million in 1940 to US$12.8 million in 1949 (this last figure being 47% 
of the 1940 level).104 Interestingly, the lowest level of public debt was reached in 1947 (37% of 
the 1940 figure), the year in which the first negotiations for privatizing the PR Shoe and Leather 
began.  
As  for  industrial  policy  –  the  core  of  economic  policy  in  Puerto  Rico  –  its  main 
characteristics were  the desire  to  promote  industrialization,  and  the  desire  to  attract  foreign 
capital for the industrialization process, particularly from the continental US.
105 According to the 
Puerto  Rican  leaders  of  the  construction  of  the  state owned  manufacturing  sector,  it  soon 
became clear that Puerto Rico would never have enough money to build government factories 
able to increase production and opportunities to the level needed and expected.
106 Furthermore, 
                                                 
103  In  recent  experiences  (Bortolotti  and  Milella,  “Privatization  in  Western  Europe”;  Yarrow,  “A  Theory  of 
Privatization”), as well as in Germany 1934 1937 (Bel, “Against the mainstream,”) 
104 Puerto Rico Planning Board, Economic development, p. 81, table 48. Note that very large new bond and long term 
issues of the public corporations were made in 1949 1950, most of which consisted of obligations of the Water 
Resources Authority and the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority.  
105 Perloff, “Transforming the Economy”, p. 51. 
106 Muñoz Marín, “Development through democracy”, p. 7; Moscoso, “Industrial Development”, pp. 61 62.  
 
26
it  was  thought  that  if  the  government  engaged  in  a  wider  program  of  publicly  owned 
manufacturing plants, this “would probably seriously hinder eliciting the participation of outside 
capital in most cases”.
107  
Together with the growing impression that the government’s main objectives could not be 
accomplished by means of a full policy of building and operating publicly owned manufacturing 
firms,  the  increasing  dissatisfaction  with  the  performance  of  PRIDCO’s  subsidiaries  was 
probably another key driver of privatization. Taken as a whole, PRIDCO’s subsidiaries were in 
the  black,  but  only  one  corporation,  PR  Cement,  was  making  a  profit,  and  the  four  other 
subsidiaries were making heavy losses. In table 3 I have gathered information on the profits and 
losses incurred by each corporation between 1945 and 1950. It is plain to see that only the 
cement plant recorded profits, and that all the other corporations recorded major losses in each 
of the years studied. 
Furthermore,  there  was  also  considerable  dissatisfaction  with  the  performance  of  PR 
Cement. A comparison of its performance with that of Ponce Cement, a private factory owned 
by the Ferré Group which had began production in 1942, is particularly revealing. In 1943, 
Ponce  Cement’s  first  year  of  full  operation,  its  production  had  been  70.4%  of  that  of  PR 
Cement, and Puerto Rico had become an exporter of cement in that year. In 1948, the year in 
which the decision to privatize was firm, Ponce Cement’s production figures were 38.1% higher 
than those of PR Cement.
108 In addition to the lead Ponce Cement had achieved in production, 
the differences in price were also an important factor: While Ponce Cement was selling cement at 
US$0.75 per sack, PR Cement charged Puerto Rican government a price of US$0.95.
109 
 
                                                 
107 Moscoso, “Industrial Development”, p. 67. 
108 Data taken from Baralt, La Vida, p. 127.  
109 Baralt, La Vida, p. 177.   
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  Table 3.US$ Net profit /(loss) of PRIDCO corporations, 1945 1950 (Fiscal year July 1 June 30) 
Corporation  1945-46  1946-47  1947-48  1948-49  1949-50 
PR Cement C. 
a  457,477  499,643  1,107,308  1,271,735  758,051 
PR Glass C.  (138,615)  (138,634)  (518,949)  (316,367)  (174,573) 
PR Pulp and Paper C.     (41,492)  (228,670) 
c  in liquidation d 
PR Shoe and Leather C     (47,580) 
(271,328) 
b 
(123,596)  (24,505) 
PR Clay Products C.        (155,000)  (112,538)  (114,900) 
Notes: 
a Until 1944 45 the only subsidiary fully in operation was PR Cement C. Its profits had been US$493,865.78 
(1942 43), US$492,674.47 (1943 44), and US$247,908.78 (1944 45). 
        b No specific amount of loss for PR Pulp and Paper C. and PR Shoe and Leather C. in 1947 48 was provided. 
This figure is my own computation for the joint losses based on data in PRIDCO, Annual Report 1948. I 
have found out that net loss between July 1 1947 and April 30 1948 for each company was: 173,462   PR 
Pulp and Paper – and 20,751 – PR Shoe and Leather – (data from Travieso, Information on Subsidiaries’ 
results). Actually, the loss for the whole fiscal year must have been higher, as the joint computation made 
for the two subsidiaries shows.  
c This figure is my own computation built upon the information in PRIDCO Annual Report 1949, pp. 20, 22, 
26, 28 29, and 36. 
d In August 1949 the Board of directors of the PR Pulp and Paper Corporation decided to close down the 
plant and the Corporation went in liquidation.  
Sources: Author, based on PRIDC Annual Reports, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950. 
 
Puerto Rican policymakers were fully aware of the differences in efficiency and productivity 
between the cement factories, and of the overall inefficiency of PR Cement, as shown by a 
confidential Report produced by PRIDCO in September 1947 (a copy of which was addressed 
to Muñoz Marín)
110:  
1)  Whereas  the  cost  of  living  increased  by  53.8%  between  1941 and  1947,  the  average 
hourly wage at the Puerto Rico Cement Plant increased by 192% in the same period. 
While the average weekly wage increased by 164% [p. 3], (monetary) labor productivity 
increased by just 48.5% in the period [page 4]. 
2)  The  annual  salary  paid  in  the  PR  Cement  was  higher  than  that  paid  to  the  island’s 
policemen (first class) (25.23%), to the island’s firefighters (first class) (by 87.8%), and to 
school teachers (by 30.68%) [p. 6]. 
3)  The hourly wage at PR Cement was around 25% higher than in other industrial sectors in 
the island [p. 9]. 
4)  The hourly wage at PR Cement was around 35.85% higher than at PR Glass, and 87.88% 
higher than at PR Pulp and Paper [pp. 10 11]. 
                                                 
110 PRIDCO, Report on Puerto Rico Cement performance and productivity.  
 
28
5)  The  average weekly wage  paid  at  PR  Cement was  20.96%  higher  than at  the  Ponce 
Cement plant. PR Cement employed 160 workers, compared to 129 at Ponce Cement 
(even though Ponce produced more cement). Efficiency measured as labor productivity 
at Ponce Cement was 31% higher [p. 12]. 
The points stressed in this report provide a depressing image of PR Cement’s efficiency and 
productivity,  which  must  have  had  an  important  effect  on  Puerto  Rican  policymakers.  The 
situation raised two particular concerns. First, the wage policy in PRIDCO’s subsidiaries needed 
to  be  reformed  in  order  to  make  them  profitable,  but  PRIDCO’s  managers  could  never 
satisfactorily deal with this issue because of its political repercussions.
111 Second, there was the 
fact that wages paid to PRIDCO’s manufacturing workers, especially those in PR Cement C., 
were pushing industrial salaries in Puerto Rico upwards, with negative effects on the island’s 
competitiveness and its ability to attract foreign investment.
112 
In stark contrast to the government’s plants, the Ferré Group’s companies had a fine record 
of productive efficiency.
113 Furthermore, Muñoz Marín saw José Ferré, the brother in charge of 
                                                 
111 Moscoso, “Industrial Development”, p. 61. Moscoso also stressed the fact that, even though the government 
factories were organized as corporations, PRIDCO had many responsibilities to different government agencies. 
Because of the lack of co ordination between the departments of the government, the burden of compliance was 
excessive (p. 68). 
112 The effect of wages on industrial competitiveness was an important concern for PRIDCO’s top management. 
Following the Democratic victory in the 1948 US Presidential and legislative election (supported by PPD), Moscoso 
sent a Memorandum to Piñero, Múñoz Marín, and Fernós Isern (Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico) stating 
that  “the industrialization  program may be absolutely destroyed if Puerto Rico is not allowed to maintain the 
privilege held until now of establishing minimum wages through industrial committees”. Taking for granted that the 
Democratic victory would result in an increase of the minimum wage in the US, Moscoso added “there will be 
pressure to fully include Puerto Rico in the federal law. Should this happen, the industrialization program would be 
immediately terminated.“ (Moscoso. Memorandum to Jesús T. Piñero, Luis Múñoz Marín, and A. Fernós Isern) [author’s 
translation]. 
113 Muñoz Marín, Luis Muñoz Marín. Memorias, p. 253.  
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the  family  business,  as  an  exemplary  Puerto  Rico  entrepreneur,  the  very  opposite  of  the 
widespread model of absentee owner that – to his mind – had been one of the main obstacles to 
the  success  of  local  industrialization.
114  These  factors,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  bid 
submitted by the Ferré Group was the best received for the PRIDCO subsidiaries, explains why 
and how the sale of the four remaining factories was decided in October 1950.  
In 1950, the industrial development program was reorganized. The Economic Development 
Administration (EDA) was created as a regular department of the Puerto Rico government, 
operating with funds assigned annually by the Legislature.
115 The proceeds obtained from the sale 
of PRIDCO’s subsidiaries were used to promote EDA’s activities, and a new phase of industrial 




A large state owned enterprise (SOE) sector was built in Puerto Rico in the 1940s, a period in 
which the Island Governor was still appointed by the US President. Several public services were 
nationalized and manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper, and 
clay products. Between 1948 and 1950, the first elected government in Puerto Rico privatized the 
manufacturing SOEs, thus implementing the first large scale privatization policy in a democracy.  
                                                 
114 This can be seen through Muñoz Marín, Memorias. I owe this insight to Silvia Alvarez Curbielo.  
115 Moscoso, “Industrial Development”, p. 64.  
116 It soon delivered very successful results, as emphasized by most of the papers published in the monograph 
“Puerto Rico. A study in Democratic Development” (Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; vol. 
285, January 1953). These results probably contributed to Muñoz Marín’s performance in the 1952 gubernatorial 
election: 64.9% of the votes, an all time high. The Independent Party came second, with 19%. The two parties 
which had come second in 1948 running as a coalition fared very badly in 1952: the Statehood Party obtained only 
12.9%, and the Socialist Party 3.3%. Muñoz Marín retained strong electoral support through his entire career as 
Governor: in the 1960 election, the last one in which he ran, he obtained 58.2% of votes. In 1964, his successor as 
PPD candidate, Sánchez Vilella, obtained 59.2%.  
 
30
This work contributes to the literature by documenting the privatization process in Puerto 
Rico, and by analyzing the roles played by ideology, political interests, and economic objectives 
in the decision to privatize. Ideological bias and partisan political objectives do not appear to 
have  driven  privatization  in  Puerto  Rico.  Pragmatic  economic  concerns,  related  to  the 
performance of the government’s manufacturing firms, together with the need to attract private 
investment to foster industrialization in the island, seem to have been the main forces behind it.  
At the end of the 1940s, Puerto Rico policy makers applied a highly practical approach to 
their policies for promoting industrialization. Increasing dissatisfaction with the performance of 
the manufacturing SOEs, together with improved opportunities for stimulating privately induced 
industrialization,  suggested  that  the  experiment  of  government owned  manufacturing  firms 
should be terminated. A strong political leadership was able to deliver this policy reform.  
To conclude, it is worth stressing that privatization in Puerto Rico was far from being a story 
of  crony  capitalism  or  of  coalition  building  to  foster  the  government’s  political  interests.  It 
diverged radically from the previous instance of a policy of privatization implemented between 
1934 and 1937 by the Nazi government in Germany. Democracy, which implies checks and 
balances, transparency, and public scrutiny, may well provide an environment much less prone to 
corruption and less politically tainted privatization than a Dictatorship. Future research should 
undertake a more thorough study of the differences between privatization under Democracy and 
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